Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Domenech, Gerard; Nunez, Marina
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.005
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 469-484
• 关键词: Assignment game; Stable rules; Fair division

摘要

In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firm-covariance, and that this property characterizes these rules among all stable rules. This property allows us to shed some light on how firms can (and cannot) manipulate the firms-optimal stable rules. In particular, we show that firms cannot manipulate them by constantly over-reporting their valuations. Analogous results hold when focusing on the workers. Finally, we extend to the multiple-partners market a known characterization of the fair-division rules on the domain of simple assignment games.(c) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC