Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Naono, Miharu
• 署名单位: Kyoto University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.008
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 325-339
• 关键词: Bilingual game; evolutionary game theory; stochastic stability; Heterogeneity

摘要

The bilingual game is a simple variant of a coordination game in which players can choose between two alternative languages, but also have the option of a bilingual strategy, which allows them to coordinate with speakers of both languages at some additional cost. In this paper, we introduce heterogeneity in this cost and show how it leads to the persistence of the bilingual strategy in equilibrium. This helps to explain phenomena such as people using multiple pieces of software that can achieve the same goals, or using many smartphone messaging applications.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.