Information design in sequential procurement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fugger, Nicolas; Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Mannheim; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.013
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 79-85
• 关键词: Sequential screening; information design; auctions; procurement; COMMITMENT

摘要

We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a two-period production project. The buyer lacks the commitment not to renegotiate the contractual terms in the second period. The prospect of renegotiation makes suppliers cautious about the information revealed in period one. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and highlight the role of information design for its implementation. We show that the buyer can achieve the full commitment surplus with the appropriate information design even without commitment. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.