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作者:Rabin, M; Sobel, J
作者单位:University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要:Existing equilibrium refinements rule out Nash equilibria susceptible to deviations. We propose a framework for considering not only equilibria impervious to deviations, but also equilibria likely to recur in the long run because they are repeatedly deviated to. We explore which equilibria are recurrent with respect to the deviations underlying some existing signaling refinements. We show that the set of recurrent equilibria based on Cho and Kreps's (1987) intuitive criterion is equivalent to ...
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作者:Ching, S
摘要:We consider the problem of electing candidates in situations where the number of candidates and the number of voters may vary. An election consists of a set of candidates and a set of voters. A voting rule associates a non-empty subset of candidates with each election. We show that there is only one rule that satisfies neutrality, anonymity, independence of dominated candidates, and reinforcement. The rule is known as plurality rule: It elects the candidates that are ranked first by the larges...
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作者:Raith, M
摘要:Under which conditions do oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs? We present a general model which encompasses virtually all models of the existing literature on information sharing as special cases. Within this unifying framework we show that in contrast to the apparent inconclusiveness of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be obtained. Existing results are generalized, ...
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作者:Bond, EW; Wang, P; Yip, CK
作者单位:University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要:We examine a two-sector endogenous growth model with general constant-return-to-scale production technologies governing the evolution of human and physical capital. We prove the existence, uniqueness, and saddle-path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium. A dual approach drawing on techniques from international trade theory is used to provide complete characterization of the transitional dynamics of consumption, goods and education outputs, human and physical capital inputs, and the rel...
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作者:Maniquet, F
摘要:Assume that a set of individuals commonly own a one input one output technology. Al an average cost pricing equilibrium allocation, the consumption/contribution ratio is identical among agents and each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. The following requirement is introduced: every agent must be as well off at a selected allocation as at the average cost equilibrium that all agents prefer. The paper establishes compatibilities and incompatibilities between this requirement and some...
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作者:Burguet, R
摘要:A buyer repeatedly purchases some good. Suppliers privately learn their cost only upon producing at least once. Efficiency would imply sampling sellers until one is found with cost lower than a (increasing with time) reservation value. Then the good would be permanently purchased from the seller with lowest cost. A sequence of second-price auctions with participation premia and entry fees is shown to be both efficient and optimal for the buyer. An alternative calls for price offers by informed...
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作者:Konishi, H
摘要:This paper proves a general existence theorem for equilibrium in a local public good economy with free mobility by extending Greenberg and Shitovitz's (J. Econ. Theory 46, 1988, 223-236) approach. Each jurisdiction's collective choice rule is the d-majority voting rule proposed by Greenberg (Econometrica 47, 1979, 627-636). Spillover effects of local public goods, externalities due to the population distribution, and snob effects are all allowed. We need transitivity and completeness of prefer...
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作者:Prechac, C
作者单位:heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要:This note provides an alternative proof of a recent result of Balasko, Cass, and Shell, namely that the set of regular symmetric economies of a sunspot model with complete markets coincides with the set of regular economics of the underlying model without uncertainty. Besides being more elementary, our proof provides additional information on the structure of the set of critical equilibria. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者:Prechac, C
摘要:We introduce a financial intermediary into the stationary OLG model and investigate the efficiency of the selection procedure based on the maximisation of its commisions. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者:Bottazzi, JM; Hens, T
作者单位:Harvard University; University of Bonn; Stanford University
摘要:This paper is aimed al characterizing excess demand functions around noncritical spot price systems in two-period exchange economies with incomplete markets and real assets. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.