A simple characterization of plurality rule
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ching, S
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0119
发表日期：
1996
页码：
298-302
关键词：
摘要：
We consider the problem of electing candidates in situations where the number of candidates and the number of voters may vary. An election consists of a set of candidates and a set of voters. A voting rule associates a non-empty subset of candidates with each election. We show that there is only one rule that satisfies neutrality, anonymity, independence of dominated candidates, and reinforcement. The rule is known as plurality rule: It elects the candidates that are ranked first by the largest number of voters. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.