Optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Burguet, R
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0025
发表日期：
1996
页码：
440-455
关键词：
摘要：
A buyer repeatedly purchases some good. Suppliers privately learn their cost only upon producing at least once. Efficiency would imply sampling sellers until one is found with cost lower than a (increasing with time) reservation value. Then the good would be permanently purchased from the seller with lowest cost. A sequence of second-price auctions with participation premia and entry fees is shown to be both efficient and optimal for the buyer. An alternative calls for price offers by informed sellers, with compensations that increase in the offer. In both cases, the buyer subsidizes competition through participation premia or compensations. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.