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作者：Balder, EJ
摘要：Two abstract results are given for the existence of optimal contract selection mechanisms in principal-agent models; by a suitable reformulation of the (almost) incentive compatibility constraint, they deal with both single- and multi-agent models. In particular, it is shown that the existence results in a series of papers by F. H. Page follow from these two results. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Ray, D; Ueda, K
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：A group of agents is collectively engaged in a joint productive activity. Each agent supplies an observable input, and output is then collectively shared among the members. A Bergson-Samuelson welfare function defined on individual utilities describes the social values of the agents. However, individual actions are taken on a selfish basis. The collective decision cannot be precommitted, and is made (after inputs are chosen) to maximize welfare conditional on the input decisions. This leads to...
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作者：BenPorath, E; Kahneman, M
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：The paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed. We address the following question: What is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes? The main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when the discount factor tends to one, contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever...
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作者：Peck, J
摘要：When the arrival of traders at the market is stochastic, and it is impossible for traders who might arrive to meet ex ante, then Walrasian spot-market clearing presents consumers with price-risk and is typically not Pareto optimal. Instead. with an indivisible good and a divisible numeraire, the first-best can be achieved by an ''Exchange'' selling raffle tickers at a fixed price. When only spot market trading is feasible and consumers cannot commit to pay unless they purchase the indivisible ...
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作者：Caballe, J; Pomansky, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Russian Academy of Sciences
摘要：We analyze the class of increasing utility functions exhibiting all derivatives of alternating sign. This property, that we call mixed risk aversion, is satisfied by the utility functions most commonly used in financial economics. The utility functions displaying mixed risk aversion can be expressed as mixtures of exponential functions. We characterize stochastic dominance and we find conditions for both mutual aggravation and mutual amelioration of risks when agents are mixed risk averse. Fin...
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作者：Hofbauer, J; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：A class of evolutionary selection dynamics is defined, and the defining property convex monotonicity. is shown to be sufficient and essentially necessary for the elimination of strictly dominated pure strategies. More precisely: (1) all strictly dominated strategies :Ire eliminated along all interior solutions in all convex monotonic dynamics. and (2) for all selection dynamics where the pure-strategy growth rates are functions of their current payoffs, violation of convex monotonicity implies...
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作者：Olson, LJ; Roy, S
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：This paper analyzes conservation and extinction of renewable resources when the production function is nonconcave and the return function depends on consumption and the resource stock. The paper focuses on the efficiency of global conservation, a safe standard of conservation, and extinction. Which outcome obtains depends on the marginal rate of substitution between investment and the stock in addition to the discount Factor and the marginal productivity of the resource. Conservation may be ef...
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作者：Jost, PJ
摘要：In many circumstances, a principal who has private information when contracting with an agent may perform some further action simultaneously with (or after) the agent's choice of an action. We analyze such a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal as a noncooperative game and distinguish two extensive-form games. First, the principal can commit to his subsequent action at the time of contracting. Second, the principal's announcement for his action is not binding at the time of ...
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作者：Chambers, RG; Chung, YH; Fare, R
作者单位：Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University
摘要：We explore the relationship between R. W. Shephard's input distance function (''Cost and Production Functions,'' Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1953) and D. G. Luenberger's benefit function (J. Math. Econ. 21 (1992a), 461-481). We point out that the latter can be recognized in a production context as a directional input distance function which can exhaustively characterize technologies in both price and input space. D. McFadden's (Cost, revenue, and profit functions, in ''Production Economi...
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作者：Nishimura, K; Yano, M
作者单位：Yokohama National University
摘要：This study derives the least upper bound of discount factors of future utilities for which a cyclical optimal period-three path emerges in a standard model of optimal growth. For this purpose. we characterize a cyclical optimal period-three path by a dual path or prices. We then demonstrate that a condition far the existence of a cyclical optimal period-three path can be expressed by the existence of a solution to a sytem of linear equations. By solving this system, we demonstrate that the lea...
