Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Rabin, M; Sobel, J
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California San Diego
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0001
发表日期：
1996
页码：
1-25
关键词：
摘要：
Existing equilibrium refinements rule out Nash equilibria susceptible to deviations. We propose a framework for considering not only equilibria impervious to deviations, but also equilibria likely to recur in the long run because they are repeatedly deviated to. We explore which equilibria are recurrent with respect to the deviations underlying some existing signaling refinements. We show that the set of recurrent equilibria based on Cho and Kreps's (1987) intuitive criterion is equivalent to their solution concept, but that applying our framework to existing cheap-talk refinements make those solution concepts more realistic and guarantee existence where their current formulations do not. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.