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作者：Aoyagi, M
摘要：The paper studies a repeated game in which a long-run player without discounting faces another long-run player with strict discounting. The game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player's strategy choice: she may be a rational player. but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies, The rational patient player's equilibrium payoff in this perturbed game is analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the lower bound on ...
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作者：Eichberger, J; Kelsey, D
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Birmingham
摘要：In this paper we show that while individuals with non-additive beliefs may display a strict preference for randomisation in an Anscombe-Aumann framework, they will not do so in a Savage style decision theory. Moreover they will be indifferent to randomisation, unless they have strict preferences between two randomising devices with the same probabilities. We argue that this is related to the distinction between one- and two-stage Choquet integrals. We believe our result will have implications ...
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作者：Kranich, L
摘要：We propose an axiomatic approach to ranking lists of opportunity sets of the form O = (O-1, ..., O-n) on the basis of fairness. First, we consider two agents each of whom faces a finite set of opportunities. To demonstrate the tractability of our approach, we axiomatically characterize the cardinality difference relation according to which O is more equitable than O' if the difference between the cardinalities of the sets in O is less than the difference in O'. We then generalize the analysis ...
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作者：Cripps, MW; Schmidt, KM; Thomas, JP
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Bonn
摘要：The paper analyzes reputation effects in perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some positive prior probability that one of the players is committed to play the same (pure) action in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium playoff in all Nash equilibria. This bound is tight and independent of what other types have positive probability. It is generally lower than Fudenberg and Levine's bound for games with a long-run player facing a sequence of short-r...
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作者：Garratt, R; Qin, CZ
摘要：Lotteries are introduced in the exchange model of Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974), 23-37). In competition, traders buy and sell probabilities on houses. When considering the core, feasible allocations of the economy and blocking allocations of coalitions may involve lotteries. Among other results, we show that the set of lottery equilibrium allocations is non-empty and does not contain all competitive equilibrium allocations, the core of the Shapley/Scarf model is a strict subset of...
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作者：Nehring, K; Puppe, C
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：The paper addresses the problem of extending an order on a set to a ranking of its subsets based on principles of independence and continuity. The central result is a characterization of rankings that depend on the maximal and minimal element only. The independence condition used in this result is contrasted with a stronger independence condition prevalent in the literature on complete ignorance problems in decision making under uncertainty and-under a different interpretation-also in the lite...
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作者：Bernhardt, D; Hughson, E
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：This paper incorporates institutional features of trading markets including the discrete nature of the price grid and determines the consequences for prices and strategic behavior. Interactions between market makers is complex: because equi librium prices are not determined by a zero-expected-profits condition, priority rules and the timing of offers have significant effects on equilibrium outcomes. Discreteness effectively limits competition and permits market makers to offer profitable quote...
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作者：Hernandez, A; Santos, MS
摘要：In this paper we consider a sequential trading economy with incomplete financial markers and a finite number of infinitely lived agents. We propose a specification of agents' budget sets and show that such specification features several desirable properties. We then establish the existence of an equilibrium for a regular class of economies. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Gul, F; Pearce, DG
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We show that ii the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a stage game is convexified by the introduction of public random variables, then forward induction loses all its power as an argument for refining Nash equilibrium. We establish that our argument does not depend on a convenient choice of off-equilibrium path beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Kolpin, V
摘要：Previous literature has shown that the serial cost sharing rule is endowed with a variety of desirable incentive and equity features. By definition, applications of this mechanism are essentially constrained to single service facilities. We investigate difficulties that emerge when attempting to extend serial cost sharing to multi-product environments. In particular, we show that such an extension is incompatible with the additivity axiom. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
