-
作者：Liu, LH
摘要：This paper shows that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, which is the unique Nash equilibrium, for the standard Cournot oligopoly model with linear demand and asymmetric, linear costs. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：Roth, D
摘要：This paper shows that predatory pricing is rationalizable and is in this sense rational even when there is no uncertainty regarding structural parameters such as cost or demand. Predatory pricing is modelled as a war of attrition. All strategy profiles-including all possible lengths of predatory battles-are rationalizable in the extensive form. Despite this, weak restrictions on beliefs combined with rationalizability have drastic implications for the play of the game. (C) 1996 Academic Press,...
-
作者：Dutta, B; Sen, A
摘要：The paper demonstrates the formal similarity between the problem of ranking opportunity sets and an Arrovian aggregation problem. This parallel is exploited to axiomatize several rules for ranking opportunity sets. The standard Framework is also extended to allow for considerations of the diversity of available choices. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：Aoyagi, M
摘要：The paper Formulates a simple two-person model of learning with pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the asymptotic behavior of players' beliefs when the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：Truchon, L
作者单位：Laval University; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：J. A. Ferejohn and P. C. Fishburn [J. Econ. Theory 21 (1979), 28-45] prove a condition for the acyclicity of binary decision rules, which generalizes all conditions found previously in the literature. Their condition has a combinatorial aspect and is not easy to interpret, let alone to verify. This payer studies how their condition is related to more simple and more operational ones. Six conditions are shown to imply their condition and to be implied by their condition under appropriate assump...
-
作者：Gensemer, S; Hong, L; Kelly, JS
摘要：Fair division rules are examined in a framework consisting of local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments, and (possibly) different division rules. Individuals have single-peaked preferences and are free to choose the environments where they live. Given that tile rules satisfy various desirable properties such as efficiency, strategy-proofness, or envy-freeness, the extent to which individuals have incentives to migrate to other environments is explored. (C) 1...
-
作者：Hopenhayn, HA; Werner, IM
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Stanford University
摘要：This paper develops a sequential random matching model of asset trading to analyze how the extent of information about an asset that is available in the market can affect its tradeability. Liquidity traders are rational agents with higher impatience, which make optimal intertemporal consumption decisions given the trading constraints. Information asymmetries result in unexecuted trades. Agents who want to consume relatively early optimally choose to exchange initial assets for new assets that ...
-
作者：Jackson, MO; Wolinsky, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks, when self-interested individuals can form or sever links. First, for two stylized models, we characterize the stable and efficient networks. There does not always exist a stable network that is efficient. Next, we show that this tension persists generally: to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient, one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production. We charac...
-
作者：Reny, PJ; Wooders, MH
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarfs Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition. it is shown that if there are at most a countable number of points in the partnered core of a game then at least one core point is minimally partnered, meaning ...
-
作者：Sorin, S
作者单位：Universite Paris Nanterre
摘要：Strategic market games describe mechanisms of formation of prices and of redistribution of goods. We introduce here a model without commodity money but where the use of fiat money does not imply the possibility of debt, hence the necessity for penalty. This is done through a collection of exchange rates that allows For a coherent price system and a redistribution that clears the market for any initial bids of the agents. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
