Allocation rules for a commonly owned technology: The average cost lower bound
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Maniquet, F
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0065
发表日期：
1996
页码：
490-507
关键词：
摘要：
Assume that a set of individuals commonly own a one input one output technology. Al an average cost pricing equilibrium allocation, the consumption/contribution ratio is identical among agents and each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. The following requirement is introduced: every agent must be as well off at a selected allocation as at the average cost equilibrium that all agents prefer. The paper establishes compatibilities and incompatibilities between this requirement and some traditional requirements. Finally, the new loner bound is combined with properties such as technological monotonicity or contraction independence to characterize Mas-Colell's constant returns equivalent allocation rule. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.