1996

最新文章

• Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics AI翻译
  作者：Einy, E; Holzman, R; Monderer, D; Shitovitz, B
  作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Haifa; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; McGill University
  摘要：It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of finitely many non-atomic probability measures is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. This result is used to characterize some stable sets of large games which have a decreasing returns to scale property. We also study exact non-atomic glove-market games. In particular we show that in a glove-market game which consists of the minimum of finitely many mutually singular non-atomic measures, the core i...
• Criteria for distributive equity: Characterization in terms of share value AI翻译
  作者：Otsuki, M
  摘要：Taking up three criteria. namely, egalitarian equivalence, guarantee of equal split, and Freedom from envy. the present paper considers conditions under which each of these equity criteria satisfies the desiderata of resource monotonicity and population solidarity. These conditions are presented in a uniform fashion, after definition of the equity criteria in terms of share value. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Dynamic monopoly with nondurable goods AI翻译
  作者：Dudey, M
  摘要：A nondurable good monopolist who posts a single price will generally achieve an inefficient outcome. But is it possible that the monopolist would achieve efficiency by repeatedly posting prices before delivery? If buyers recognize the effect of current purchases on future prices, then under complementary ideal conditions, the answer is yes. On the other hand traditional concerns about monopoly are viable if the seller bears a small cost per buyer of market reopening. (C) 1996 Academic Press, I...
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities AI翻译
  作者：Sasaki, H; Toda, M
  作者单位：Tokyo Keizai University
  摘要：In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Symmetric smooth consumption externalities AI翻译
  作者：Cres, H
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
  摘要：Based on Arrow's model of a pure exchange economy with smooth consumption externalities. this paper studies how the internalization of external effects through a network of markets between agents introduces symmetry breakings in the set of equilibria. ir shows indeed how identical agents can be treated asymmetrically by complete markets, This work emphasizes that equilibrium allocations may be very sensitive to the way Coase-type rights are distributed. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic AI翻译
  作者：Muthoo, A
  摘要：This paper studies a one-shot, simultaneous-move bargaining game. Each bargainer makes a partial commitment (a share of the unit size cake that she would like to get), which can later be revoked at some cost to the player. The payoffs are defined, in part, by the Nash bargaining solution, where the feasible utility set is affected by the players' partial commitments. Under certain assumptions on the two cost-of-revoking functions, we establish that the model has a unique Nash equilibrium. It i...
• A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility AI翻译
  作者：Robson, AJ
  摘要：A biological model is developed here to determine the fittest attitude to risk. With a fixed environment, the type maximizing expected offspring is selected. This yields the expected utility theorem when translated into a criterion for evaluating gambles over commodities. With a random environment, however, the type selected is strictly less averse to idiosyncratic risk than to risk which is correlated across all individuals. The implied criterion for choice over gambles does not satisfy the e...
• A communication-proof equilibrium concept AI翻译
  作者：Ferreira, JL
  摘要：This paper proposes an equilibrium concept for the classes of environments in which players can communicate with each other but cannot make binding agreements. The communication-proof equilibrium is intended to be regarded as an extension of both coalition- and renegotiation-proof equilibria. Conceptual foundations for this particular definition are discussed as it is confronted with other definitions in these environments. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Stability of competitive equilibrium with respect to recursive and learning processes AI翻译
  作者：Balasko, Y; Royer, D
  作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
  摘要：We study the stability of competitive equilibria for recursive processes considered in the learning litterature. We define h-stability (resp. F-stability, resp. infinity-stability) to mean stability for the least squares h-process (resp. h-stability for some finite h, resp, with respect to the infinite least squares learning process). We show that h-stability implies h'-stability for h
• Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting AI翻译
  作者：Cooper, DJ
  摘要：I examine a model of finite automata playing the repealed prisoners dilemma in an evolutionary setting, similar to that developed by Binmore and Samuelson. The only alteration made to the model is the use of finite costs of complexity, as opposed to lexicographic costs of complexity. The results of Binmore and Samuelson are not robust to this change. Using finite costs of complexity, a folk theorem result is proved in place of the uniqueness result of Binmore and Samuelson. (C) 1996 Academic P...