Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Konishi, H
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0027
发表日期：
1996
页码：
480-509
关键词：
摘要：
This paper proves a general existence theorem for equilibrium in a local public good economy with free mobility by extending Greenberg and Shitovitz's (J. Econ. Theory 46, 1988, 223-236) approach. Each jurisdiction's collective choice rule is the d-majority voting rule proposed by Greenberg (Econometrica 47, 1979, 627-636). Spillover effects of local public goods, externalities due to the population distribution, and snob effects are all allowed. We need transitivity and completeness of preferences; these assumptions are not used by Greenberg and Shitovitz because they do not permit consumers to move. Free mobility of consumers causes disconnections in consumption sets, a problem addressed here. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.