1996

最新文章

• A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions AI翻译
  作者：Piccione, M; Tan, GF
  摘要：This paper studies the equilibrium bidding behavior in a first-price sealed-bid auction when the number of informed bidders is not common knowledge. Both the independent private values and the common value cases are analyzed, under the assumption that a ''neutral'' signal exists. In equilibrium, experts and non-experts draw their bids from distinct supports: experts bid in the upper and lower tail of the bidding distribution and non-experts randomize their bids in between. For common values, i...
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria AI翻译
  作者：Battigalli, P
  摘要：This paper evaluates different refinements of subgame perfection, which rely on different restrictions on players' assessments, using a simple and intuitive independence property for conditional probability systems on the space of strategy profiles. This independence property is necessary for full consistency of assessments, and it is equivalent to full consistency in games with observable deviators. Furthermore, while every conditional system on the strategies satisfying the independence prop...
• An exact discount factor restriction for period-three cycles in dynamic optimization models AI翻译
  作者：Mitra, T
  摘要：This paper explores the precise extent of discounting needed to generate period-three cycles in a standard aggregative dynamic optimization framework. It is shown that there is a ''universal constant'', M = [(root 5 - 1)/2](2) approximate to 0.3819, such that (i) if an optimal program of any dynamic optimization model exhibits a period-three cycle, then the discount factor is less than M; and (ii) if the discount factor is smaller than M, then it is possible ro construct a transition possibili...
• Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money AI翻译
  作者：Hurkens, S
  摘要：We investigate the consequences of allowing some players to send a costly message before a game is played. Since messages have no literal meaning, sending costly messages is also called ''burning money.'' We consider a setting with n players among which k have the possibility to burn money. We show that strategy profiles in sets that are dosed under rational behavior yield all players that have the possibility to burn, their preferred outcome. Moreover, in such equilibria no money is actually ...
• Participation costs and efficient auctions AI翻译
  作者：Stegeman, M
  摘要：Suppose that risk neutral agents have independently (and perhaps asymmetrically) distributed private valuations for an indivisible object. A mechanism assigns the object, but it is costly to send messages to the coordinator. In these circumstances, the second-price auction has an equilibrium that is classically ex ante efficient, given general opportunities to invest in information about or enhancements of own valuations. In contrast, the first-price sealed bid auction may have no efficient eq...
• A note on stochastic independence without Savage-null events AI翻译
  作者：Battigalli, P; Veronesi, P
  作者单位：Harvard University
  摘要：We provide two axiomatic characterizations of a stochastic independence property for conditional probability systems, previously proposed by Hammond. One characterization relies on the theory of lexicographic expected utility due to L. Blume er nl. [Econometrica 59 (1991), 61-79]; the other relies on the theory of conditional expected utility maximization due to Myerson [''Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,'' Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991]. Journal of Economic Literature Classificat...
• Protocols forcing consensus AI翻译
  作者：Krasucki, P
  摘要：We analyze n agents communicating in order to reach consensus. We show how some conditions on the topology of the communication graph (the order in which individuals communicate) are sufficient lo guarantee consensus on the value of a function satisfying the ''sure-thing'' condition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C78. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.
• Mechanism design under alternative information structures and constrained capacity AI翻译
  作者：Arya, A; Glover, J; Young, R
  作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
  摘要：In applied models, the choice of a particular incomplete information structure appears to have been motivated primarily by technical convenience. The information structures used can be classified as either probabilistic or partitional. Information is probabilistic if no agent can rule out any type profile of the remaining agents and, for at]east one type of one agent, the conditional and marginal probability distributions over the remaining agents' types are not equal. information is partition...
• Incremental risk aversion and diversification preference AI翻译
  作者：Hong, CS; Herk, LF
  作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Columbia University; University of Warsaw
  摘要：The class of mean-independent incremental risks defined with respect tfr an initial risk, or status quo, is shown tu coincide with the vector space of incremental risks generated from risks that are individually independent of the status quo. Using this characterization of mean independence, aversion toward independent risk increases, together with diversification preference for mean-independent risk increases, implies aversion toward mean-independent risk increases. By contrast, a nondiversif...
• Product differentiation in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly AI翻译
  作者：Canoy, M
  作者单位：KU Leuven; University of Amsterdam
  摘要：In a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with homogeneous goods an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. Non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not solely due to the homogeneous goods assumption. In this paper I consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with product differentiation and I parametrize when an equilibrium exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D4, L1. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.