-
作者：Zhou, L
摘要：In this paper I investigate Harsanyi's utilitarianism aggregation theorems for general societies. It is proved that the social utility function is a linear (and non-negative) aggregation of individual utility functions if and only if the Pareto indifference (or the Pareto) condition holds, and that the linear aggregation has an integral representation under some regular conditions. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
-
作者：Blum, Y; Roth, AE; Rothblum, UG
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：In contrast to entry-level professional labor markets, in which cohorts of candidates and positions become available at the same time (e.g., when candidates graduate from school), senior level positions typically become available when an incumbent retires, or a new position is created, and when a senior position is filled a new vacancy is often created elsewhere. We model senior level labor markets as two-sided matching markets in which matchings are destabilized by retirements and new entries...
-
作者：Merlin, VR; Saari, DG
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n greater than or equal to 3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By using a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying all profiles which are s...
-
作者：Carlsson, H; Dasgupta, S
作者单位：Lund University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：An equilibrium of a signaling game is noise-proof if it survives a small perturbation of the Receiver's perception of the signal. We derive conditions for noise proofness and prove existence for signaling games where the Receiver has two actions, the message space is a real interval, and standard monotonicity conditions are met. Such ames have a continuum of equilibria which satisfy the never-a-weak-best-reply criterion (NWBR), but often a unique noise proof equilibrium. Every noise-proof equi...
-
作者：Wang, C
摘要：M. Jensen and K. Murphy (1990, J. Polit. Econ. 98, 225-264) argue that the observed pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation is too low to be consistent with formal agency theory. This paper uses a dynamic agency model to offer a resolution of the Jensen and Murphy puzzle. We show that the dynamic agency model can predict either a positive or a negative pay-performance sensitivity, depending on the parameter values of the model and the distribution of the CEOs' initial expected discount...
-
作者：Tovey, CA
摘要：Balasko and Cres [2] introduce a probabilistic model of population preference profiles on n alternatives. For supermajority voting at any level tau>.5286... they show that the probability of Condorcet cycles (intransitivity of the aggregate preference) tends quickly to 0 as ii increases. This paper offers an alternative analysis that relates voting outcomes to the behavior of sample medians. Condorcet cycles turn out to be asymptotically rare for all tau>1/2, but for the disappointing reason t...
-
作者：Hori, H
摘要：This paper is concerned with the issue: Does there exist a social security program which can be maintained period after period? To address this issue, the paper considers dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy. The altruism is intergenerational, nonpaternalistic, and two-sided. Lt is assumed that generations coexisting in the same period agree on a social welfare Function, which evaluates the consumption of various generations, and play a game against those living ...
-
作者：McKelvey, RD; McLennan, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Let S=Pi(i=1)(n) S-i be the strategy space for a finite n-person game. Let (s(10),...,s(n0)) epsilon S be any strategy n-tuple, and let T-i=S-i-{s(i0)}, i=1,...,n. We show that the maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with strategy sets S-i is the number of partitions P={P-1,...,P-n} of boolean OR(r) T-i such that, for each i, \P-i\=\T-t\ and P-i boolean AND T-i=0. The bound is tight, as we give a method for constructing a game with the maximum number of equilibria...
-
作者：Pearce, D; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency, time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments. Moral hazard in production leads to a non-degenerate distribution of income, which the government would like to ''flatten'' ex post. Self-enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution. We investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem, an...
-
作者：Bikhchandani, S; Mamer, JW
摘要：We analyze an exchange economy in which (i) all commodities except money are indivisible, (ii) agents' preferences can be described by a reservation value for each bundle of indivisible objects, and (iii) all agents are price-takers. We obtain a necessary and sufficient condition under which market clearing prices exist. Implications for market mechanisms are discussed. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
