Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Tovey, CA
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2310
发表日期：
1997
页码：
271-279
关键词：
摘要：
Balasko and Cres [2] introduce a probabilistic model of population preference profiles on n alternatives. For supermajority voting at any level tau>.5286... they show that the probability of Condorcet cycles (intransitivity of the aggregate preference) tends quickly to 0 as ii increases. This paper offers an alternative analysis that relates voting outcomes to the behavior of sample medians. Condorcet cycles turn out to be asymptotically rare for all tau>1/2, but for the disappointing reason that preferences are rare. In contrast, for simple majority voting, tau=1/2, cycles occur with probability converging to 1 as n-->infinity. (C) 1997 Academic Press.