Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Pearce, D; Stacchetti, E
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2217
发表日期：
1997
页码：
282-305
关键词：
摘要：
In a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency, time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments. Moral hazard in production leads to a non-degenerate distribution of income, which the government would like to ''flatten'' ex post. Self-enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution. We investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem, and show that in the constrained-optimal equilibrium, usually a linear tax schedule is imposed. This remains true if renegotiation of the social agreement is possible. (C) 1997 Academic Press.