1997

最新文章

• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player AI翻译
  作者：Baliga, S; Corchon, LC; Sjostrom, T
  作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Harvard University
  摘要：In this paper we study a situation where the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome Function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume (i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions ...
• On independence for non-additive measures, with a Fubini theorem AI翻译
  作者：Ghirardato, P
  摘要：An important technical question arising in economic and financial applications of decision models with non-additive beliefs is how to define stochastic independence. In fact the straightforward generalization of independence does not in general yield a unique product. I discuss the problem of independence, with specific focus on the validity of the Fubini theorem. The latter holds in general only for a special class of functions. It also requires a stronger notion of independent product. This ...
• The revelation of information and self-fulfilling beliefs AI翻译
  作者：Dutta, J; Morris, S
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
  摘要：At a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE), individuals are assumed to know the map from states to prices. This hypothesis has two components, that agents agree (consensus) and that they have point expectations (degeneracy). We consider economies where agents' beliefs are described by a joint distribution on states and prices, and these beliefs are fulfilled at equilibrium. Beliefs are self-fulfilling if every price in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium price. The correspondin...
• Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring AI翻译
  作者：Miller, NH
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：This paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation. No other partner has any additional information. In such a model, whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner, the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability. (C) 1997 Acad...
• The nucleolus is contested-garment-consistent: A direct proof AI翻译
  作者：Benoit, JP
  作者单位：New York University
  摘要：We give a simple direct proof of Aumann and Maschler's result that the nucleolus is the contested-garment solution of a bankruptcy game. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
• Statistical equilibrium in one-step forward looking economic models AI翻译
  作者：Krebs, T
  摘要：This paper combines statistical with economic equilibrium analysis in the context of one-step forward looking economic models. For a given state space, the economic analysis determines a set of Markov processes consistent with economic equilibrium, the set of expectational equilibria. The concept of statistical equilibrium rationalizes the introduction of a probability measure on the set of expectational equilibria. In the infinite observations limit, there exists a unique expectational equili...
• General equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition: A Cournotian approach AI翻译
  作者：dAspremont, C; Ferreira, RD; GerardVaret, LA
  作者单位：Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
  摘要：In a pure exchange economy we propose a general equilibrium concept under imperfect competition, the ''Cournotian Monopolistic Competition. Equilibrium,'' and compare it to the Cournot-Walras and the Monopolistic Competition concepts. The advantage of the proposed concept is to require less computational ability from the agents. The comparison is made first through a simple example, then through a mon abstract concept, the P-equilibrium, based on a general notion of price coordination. (C) 199...
• Competition among institutions AI翻译
  作者：Caplin, A; Nalebuff, B
  作者单位：Yale University
  摘要：Economic theory offers two different approaches to the analysis of group formation and the role of institutions. General equilibrium approach explores the influence of the economic environment on formation of coalitions. Game theory explores the influence of institutional rules on equilibrium outcomes. We introduce an integrative approach - an institution's policy depends on its membership, while its membership depends on the policies of all the institutions. We present three distinct mathemat...
• On opportunity inequality measurement AI翻译
  作者：Ok, EA
  作者单位：New York University
  摘要：I study the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. The analysis begins by developing alternative ways of formulating the notion of equalizing transfers in the context of opportunity distributions. It is readily observed that any such formulation must rely on agents' preferences over individual opportunity sets. and therefore. a theory of opportunity inequality measurement must be conditional upon the social opportunity set ranking one postulates. Unfortu...
• Reinterpreting the kernel AI翻译
  作者：Serrano, R
  摘要：The reduced game relevant for the consistency of the prekernel is used to reinterpret this solution concept in a way that makes it independent of interpersonal utility comparisons. Based on this reinterpretation, a non-cooperative model is presented that yields in stationary equilibria the prekernel (kernel) for the class of monotonic transferable utility games. Next, we apply the same non-cooperative model to more general coalitional games. For pure bargaining problems, the model yields the N...