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作者：Dutta, B; Masso, J
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's co-workers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Aliprantis, CD; Border, KC; Burkinshaw, O
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We discuss the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics in the context of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model with an infinite dimensional commodity space. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D51, D61. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Monderer, D; Samet, D; Sela, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：A learning process is belief affirming if the difference between a player's expected payoff in the next period, and the average of his or her past payoffs converges to zero. We show that every smooth discrete fictitious play and every continuous fictitious play is belief affirming. We also provide conditions under which general averaging processes are belief affirming. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Vila, JL; Zariphopoulou, T
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In this paper. we use stochastic dynamic programming to study the intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice of an infinitely lived agent who faces a constant opportunity set and a borrowing constraint, We show that. under general assumptions on the agent's utility function, optimal policies exist and can be expressed as feedback Functions of current wealth. We describe these policies in detail, when the agent's utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion. (C) 1997 Academic P...
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作者：Garratt, R; Qin, CZ
摘要：Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are all balanced with respect to these vectors of balancing weights are called totally L-balanced games. We show that such games are precisely the ones that can be generated from direct lottery markets. Total L-balancedness is equivalent to superadditivity. Thus, many interesting games that are not totally balanced, but...
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作者：Skiadas, C
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatic basis for a representation of personal preferences in which the utility of an act can be expressed as an expected value of conditional utilities of the act given any set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive scenarios, under a unique subjective probability. The representation is general enough to incorporate state-dependent utilities and/or utilities with dependencies across states, as, for example, in the case of disappointment aversion. More generally, this is...
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作者：Mitra, T; Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We propose the principle of equal sacrifice to determine the class of ''vertically inequitable'' progressive taxes. A necessary condition for an income tax Function to be equal sacrifice is formulated, and hence, a subclass of progressive taxes which cannot inflict the same sacrifice upon all individuals relative to any strictly increasing and concave utility function is determined. Conversely, it is shown in a general framework that any convex (thus progressive) tax function satisfies the pri...
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作者：Barbera, S; Masso, J; Neme, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：We consider a broad class of situations where 3 society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must satisfy a property, to be called the ''intersection property,'' which becomes increasingly st...
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作者：Dubey, P; Neyman, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Four axioms are placed oil a correspondence from smooth, non-atomic economies to their allocations. We show than thr axioms categorically determine, the (coincident) competitive-core-value correspondence. Thus any solution is equivalent to the above three if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms. In this sense our result is tantamount to an ''equivalence principle.'' At the same time, our result implies that the three solutions themselves are determined by the axions and so serves as an axioma...
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作者：Aiyagari, SR; Wallace, N
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Miami
摘要：Policy regarding what the government accepts in transactions is embedded in a version of the Kiyotaki-Wright model of media of exchange. In an example with two goods and one fiat money, the policies that are consistent with fiat money as the unique medium of exchange are identified. These policies have the government favoring fiat money in its transactions. A benefit and a cost accompany any such policy. The benefit is that a worse nonmonetary steady state is eliminated; the cost is that a bet...
