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作者：Shin, SW; Suh, SC
作者单位：University of Windsor
摘要：We explore the possibility of constructing desirable game forms that doubly implement solutions in the commons problem. For thr desirability of a game form, we require that the game form satisfy several properties such as voluntary participation. quantity announcements, forthrightness, nonwastefulness, and best response property. Then we identify a class of solutions which are doubly implementable by such game forms. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Khan, MA; Rath, KP; Sun, YN
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore
摘要：We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games. We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of action sets cannot be relaxed, and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Leach, J
摘要：A union is assumed to make a sequence of ''take it or leave it'' wage demands to a firm which produces a storable good. Equilibrium has the following properties: 1. The firm chooses to accumulate inventories even though there is no uncertainty. 2. The accumulation of inventories lowers wages by reducing the rents from further production and therefore harms the union without benefitting the firm. 3. There can be intermittent work stoppages (i.e., strikes) even though there is no uncertainty. Th...
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作者：Charupat, N; Prisman, EZ
摘要：Existing literature points to the role of market frictions in providing motivations for financial innovations. In this payer, we study the effectiveness of the arbitrage pricing approach and the design and pricing of innovated securities in economies with restrictions on short sales. In the process, we also define the no-arbitrage conditions that is appropriate for such economies. The differences between our results and Chen's [3] are pointed out when appropriate. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Brusco, S
摘要：In this paper we consider the principal-multiple agents problem when collusion among agents is possible. Collusion is captured by the use of equilibrium notions allowing for coalitional deviations. We first analyze the constraints that collusion puts on feasible wage schemes. Differently from the case of subgame perfect implementation the first best is not implementable. We provide a necessary condition that compensation schemes achieving the second best must satisfy. Roughly stated, the condi...
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作者：Epstein, LG
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of British Columbia
摘要：In the context of finite normal form games, this paper addresses the formalization and implications of the hypothesis that players are rational and that this is common knowledge. The innovation is to admit notions of rationality other than subjective expected utility maximization. For example, rationality can be defined by the alternative restrictions that preferences are probabilistically sophisticated conform to the multiple-priors model or are monotonic. The noted hypothesis is related to s...
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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper investigates birth-date dependent principles for social evaluation in an intertemporal framework in which population size may vary. WP weaken the strong Pareto principle in order to allow individuals' birth dates to matter in establishing a social ordering. Using the axiom independence of the utilities of the dead, we characterize population principles with a recursive structure. If the individual substitution principle and an individual intertemporal equivalence axiom are added. bi...
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作者：SchmittGrohe, S
摘要：This paper compares four equilibrium business cycle models with increasing returns to scale production technologies that allow for aggregate fluctuations due to self-fulfilling expectations. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria are derived. Numerical examples demonstrate that the degree of increasing returns necessary for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria lies in the upper range of available empirical estimates. The paper also show...
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作者：Goyal, S; Janssen, MCW
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：We study the long run outcome when communities with different conventions interact. We introduce the notion of non-exclusive conventions to model the idea that, by incurring some additional costs agents can remain flexible and hence coordinate their activities more successfully. We show that if these costs of flexibility are low (high) and interaction is local then the Pareto-efficient (risk-dominant) convention prevails in both communities. At intermediate cost levels, the conventions coexist...
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作者：Arya, A; Glover, J; Hughes, JS
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Duke University
摘要：This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at-will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
