-
作者：Ghiglino, C; Tvede, M
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Copenhagen
摘要：A pure exchange, general equilibrium model is considered and the equilibrium set is studied. It is shown for all total endowments and an open and dense set of preferences that if there are l greater than or equal to 2 commodities and m greater than or equal to 2 consumers then there exists a set of distributions of endowments with nonempty interior such that the associated economies have at least l-1+min{l,m} equilibria For l+min{l,m} even and at least l-2+min{l,m} equilibria for l+min{L,m} od...
-
作者：Xue, LC
摘要：This article extends Chwe's (J. Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-325) nonemptiness result (Proposition 2) of the largest consistent set by relaxing both conditions of his proposition, including the countability of the set of alternatives. Such an extension enables the largest consistent set to be applied to models (e.g., the Cournot oligopoly model) with continuum of alternatives. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
-
作者：Schreft, SL; Smith, BD
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We consider a monetary growth model in which banks arise to provide liquidity. In addition, there is a government that issues not only money, but interest-bearing bonds; these bonds compete with capital in private portfolios. When the government fixes a constant growth rate for the money stock, we show that there can exist multiple nontrivial monetary steady states. One of these steady states is a saddle, while the other can be a sink. Moreover, paths approaching a steady state can display dam...
-
作者：Sonmez, T
摘要：We study manipulation of solutions by hospitals via underreporting their capacities in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match medical interns and hospitals in United States is manipulable in this way. Our main result is that there is no solution that is stable and non-manipulable ria capacities. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
-
作者：Thomson, W
摘要：Our objective is to investigate the implications of the ''replacement principle'' for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences, The principle says that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved changes, all of the relevant agents should be affected in the same direction: they all gain or they all lose. We apply it to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may change, ...
-
作者：Weymark, JA
摘要：This article considers the aggregation of individual probability binary relations (ordinal probabilities) into a consensus relation when the set of states is finite. The structure imposed on such an aggregation function by unanimity and independence conditions found in the social choice literature is determined. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
-
作者：Becker, R; Zilcha, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Deterministic dynamic equilibrium models with borrowing constraints and heterogeneous agents exhibit stationary solutions where thr most patient household owns the economy's capital stock;. An example shows that this result does not carry over to stationary stochastic environments. Wa prove, under some conditions, the existence of a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in two related setups. The first is the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium where each agent's payoff depends o...
-
作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of ''noise'' that moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We model strategy selection as a birth-death process, allowing us to find a simple, closed-form solution for the stationary distribution. We examine equilibrium selection by considering the limiting case as the population gets large, eliminating aggregate noise. Conditions are established under which the ris...
-
作者：Bloch, F; Ghosal, S
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of London; University College London; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：This paper analyzes the formation of trading groups in a bilateral market where agents trade according to a Shayley-Shubik (J. Polit. Econ. 85 (1977), 937-968.) trading mechanism. The only strongly stable trading structure is the grand coalition, where all agents trade on the same market. Other weakly stable trading structures exist and are characterized by an ordering property: trading groups can be ranked by size and cannot contain very different numbers of traders of the two types. (C) 1997...
-
作者：Zapater, I
摘要：We present a nonequilibrium theory for simple communication games and use this theory to construct a new way of examining the problem of equilibrium selection in signaling and communication games. Our approach differs from the current literature in that the beliefs of the receiver after receiving an unexpected message are independent of the equilibrium payoffs. This property makes our approach immune to criticisms of conventional refinements, such as the Stiglitz critique. (C) 1997 Academic Pr...
