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作者：Tauman, Y; Urbano, A; Watanabe, J
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University; University of Valencia; Fukuoka University
摘要：We provide a simple model of price competition in a multiproduct oligopoly market. The products are of general nature. We find that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and every equilibrium consumption maximizes the total social surplus. Consumers are characterized by a set function which determines their willingness to pay for every subset of products. If this function is convex, the set of equilibrium prices coincides with the core of a cooperative game generated by this set function and the ...
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作者：Qiu, LD
摘要：This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D (research and development) competition. It shows that Cournot competition induces more R&D effort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are weak, or products are very different. If R&D productivit...
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作者：Rauh, MT
摘要：In the literature on search markets, agents know the distribution of prices or learn about it through short run Bayesian updating, even though the first assumption is unrealistic and the empirical evidence emphasizes learning in the intermediate and long runs. In this paper, a new search markets theory is developed where agents have beliefs about the distribution of prices based on finitely many of its moments and past market experiences. The main results are the existence of a Hicks-Grandmont...
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作者：Dastidar, KG
摘要：This paper examines some general notions relating to the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes. Results obtained by Vives in this connection are reconsidered in a homogeneous product market and it is shown that these results are sensitive to the marker sharing rules. It is found that the results are always true under those market sharing rules which have the property of including the competitive equilibrium in the set of Bertrand equilibria (for example, the ''capacity sharin...
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作者：Madrigal, V; Scheinkman, JA
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We present a model of market-making in which traders possess private and heterogeneous information, and the market-maker acts strategically to maximize profits. Thus, the market-maker must now consider that the prices he sets affect both the information he acquires (through the order flow) and the amount oi aggregated information he releases back to the market. We show that the equilibrium prier as a function of the order flow displays a discontinuity. This discontinuity can be interpreted as ...
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作者：Venditti, A
摘要：Studies of optimal growth in a multisector framework are generally addressed in reduced form models, defined by an indirect utility function which summarizes the consumer's preferences and the technologies. Strong concavity assumptions allow to obtain some results about differentiability of optimal solutions and stability of steady states. However there does not exist any information about the conditions that have to be placed on the fundamentals to obtain such a property. This paper shows tha...
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作者：VillaBoas, JM
摘要：Comparing fixed points of different mappings is often required when doing economic analysis. I present here some results on the comparison of fixed points of different mappings that generalize and have as a particular case the super-modularity results on the same topic. The main result is that if we take a certain order greater than or equal to for which the mappings are increasing and ordered, then the fixed points of the different mappings are also ordered in that same order: every fixed poi...
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作者：Coleman, WJ
摘要：This paper studies a broad class of infinite-horizon economies that are subject to uncertainty, and consist of households that accumulate capital and elastically supply labor. For this class of economies, methods are developed for proving the existence of an equilibrium, for characterizing an equilibrium, and for verifying, at a computational level, that an equilibrium is unique. Some applications of these methods to real and monetary economies are discussed. (C) 1997 Academic Press
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作者：Krishna, V; Morgan, J
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and (b) examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. Under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed-bid auction forms. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Conlon, JR
摘要：This paper considers the ''weak announcement proofness'' criterion of Matthews et al. (J. Econ. Theory (1991)) and shows that this criterion is not always weaker than announcement proofness. It is also shown that, in the class of simple sender-receiver games considered by Matthews et al., if one equilibrium Pareto dominates all of the others. then weak announcement proofness usually selects that equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
