-
作者：Gauthier, C; Poitevin, M; Gonzalez, P
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We analyze a long-term risk-sharing contract between two risk-averse agents facing self-enforcing constraints. We enlarge the contracting space to allow for an ex ante transfer before the state of nature is realized and we characterize the optimal ex ante and ex post payments. We show that optimal ex ante payments are inversely related to the non-stationary expected surplus. With i.i.d. shocks, the dynamics of the optimal contract exhibit ''experience rating'' even though there is no private i...
-
作者：Peters, M; Severinov, S
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Reo. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71-84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica, 61 (1993), 1281-1312) In which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equi...
-
作者：Robles, J
摘要：This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously In these games, payoffs. and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile as in Crawford (Econometrica 63 (1995), 103-114). A simple characterization of the set of Long Run Equilibria, analogous to the one given by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob for random pairing, is provided. Jou...
-
作者：Manelli, AM
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e...
-
作者：Zhou, YQ
摘要：In this paper we study the size of the set of equilibria on the pseudo-equilibrium manifold. It is shown that, with incomplete real asset markets, the set of equilibria is an open and dense subset of the pseudo-equilibrium manifold, whose complement is the disjoint union of a finite number of lower dimensional smooth submanifolds. When markets are generically complete, the pseudo-equilibrium manifold with fixed real asset structures is identical to the equilibrium manifold in the Arrow-Debreu ...
-
作者：Mariotti, M
摘要：Because in a strategic form game all the possibilities of communication available to the players must be explicitly listed in the strategy spaces, coalitions and coalitional behaviour are not very often taken into account in noncooperative games. However, it may be desirable, especially in applications, to separate the basic strategic features of a situation from those strategic features added as a consequence of the possibility of coalitional behaviour. We define an equilibrium for the bargai...
-
作者：Berk, JB
摘要：The general restrictions on all economic primitives (i.e., (a) endowments, (b) preferences, and (c) asset return distributions) that yield the CAPM under the expected utility paradigm are provided. These results are then used to derive the class of restrictions on preferences and the distribution of asset returns alone that provides the CAPM. We also show that the conditions that provide the CAPM and derived preferences over mean and variance are equivalent. Consequently, this paper also resol...
-
作者：Cuoco, D
摘要：This paper examines the intertemporal optimal consumption and investment problem in the presence of a stochastic endowment and constraints on the portfolio choices. Short-sale and borrowing constraints, as well as incomplete markets, can be modeled as special cases of the class of constraints we consider. Existence of optimal policies is established under fairly general assumptions on the security price coefficients and the individual's utility function. This result is obtained by using martin...
-
作者：Dutta, B; Mutuswami, S
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：A network is a graph where the nodes represent agents and an are exists between two nodes if the corresponding agents interact bilaterally. An exogeneous value function gives the value of each network, while an allocation rule describes how the value is distributed amongst the agents. M. Jackson and A. Wolinsky (1996, J. Econ. Theory 71, 44-74) have recently demonstrated a potential conflict between stability and efficiency in this framework. In this paper, we use an implementation approach to...
-
作者：Anthonisen, N
摘要：The paper considers a fixed normal-form game played among populations of agents where the populations are uncountable. Each agent plays the game in each time period against members of the other populations with whom she is randomly matched. It is shown that the distributions of observations collected by each agent within a population are asymptotically identical. Therefore, if players use learning rules that possess certain basic features (referred to as ''consistency'' and ''exchangeability''...
