On the convergence of beliefs within populations in games with learning
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Anthonisen, N
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2298
发表日期：
1997
页码：
169-184
关键词：
摘要：
The paper considers a fixed normal-form game played among populations of agents where the populations are uncountable. Each agent plays the game in each time period against members of the other populations with whom she is randomly matched. It is shown that the distributions of observations collected by each agent within a population are asymptotically identical. Therefore, if players use learning rules that possess certain basic features (referred to as ''consistency'' and ''exchangeability''), then all agent within each population eventually share the same beliefs. (C) 1997 Academic Press.