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作者：Saijo, T; Yamato, T
作者单位：University of Osaka; Japan Science & Technology Agency (JST); Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：In the previous mechanism design on public goods, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects non-excludability of public goods. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and examine a two-stage game with voluntary participation: In the first stage, each agent simultaneously decides whether she participates ill the mechanism or not, and in the second stage, knowing the other agents' participation decisions, t...
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作者：Sáez-Martí, M; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：In the models of Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57-84; 1993, J. Econ. Theory 59, 145-168), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent: history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (J. Econ. Theory 59, 145-168) bargaining model. It t...
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作者：Agastya, M
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：Players adaptively learn how to bargain. A characteristic function describes the available surplus. The underlying bargaining game extends the Nash demand game by allowing subcoalitions to reach an agreement. Players' demands must be multiples of a money unit. We show that stochastically stable allocations (SSA) (i.e., allocations that are most stable to unlikely errors) are a subset of the core. Uniqueness does not obtain even when the money unit becomes arbitrarily small. Nonetheless, every ...
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作者：Friedman, E; Moulin, H
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Duke University
摘要：We study cost sharing methods with variable demands of heterogeneous goods, additive in the cost function and meeting the dummy axiom. We consider four axioms: scale invariance (SI); demand monotonicity (DM); upper bound for homogeneous goods (UBH) placing a natural cap on cost shares when goods are homogeneous; average cost pricing for homogeneous goods (ACPH). The random order values based on stand alone costs are characterized by SI and DM. Serial costsharing, by DM and UB; the Aumann-Shapl...
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作者：Dekel, E; Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relati...
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作者：Kornish, LJ
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Y. Balcer and S. A. Lippman (1984, J. Econ. Theory 34, 292-318) develop a model to analyze the buy or wait problem under technological change. They show that this dynamic problem has a threshold solution: if the difference between the best available technology and that currently held exceeds a:certain threshold, then buy. They also claim that the threshold is increasing in the discovery potential. That is, the faster the technology is changing, the higher the threshold. In this note, we point ...
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作者：Hüsseinov, F
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：This paper presents a market equilibrium existence theorem that generalizes and unifies many well-known results. The importance of the theorem is illustrated by applications to large exchange economics. A further extension of Aumann's Existence theorem is obtained which dispenses with the monotony assumption on preferences. In addition the market equilibrium results of Grandmont and Neuefeind are compared. It is shown that the boundary condition of Grandmont's result is equivalent to some natu...
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作者：Chakravorti, B
摘要：This paper is motivated by Rubinstein (1980), who introduces a solution concept for voting games called the stability set which resolves the well-known paradox of voting. We argue here that this resolution is based on a model of farsightedness that has drawbacks: iii the voters are myopic in the sense that they ignore far-sightedness on the part of others and (ii) voters look only one step ahead and do not consider events arbitrarily hr ahead. To address these issues, we propose a model of con...
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作者：Wallner, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper analyzes a finite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly, restricting attention to Markov strategies. The solution yields stationary patterns, independent of initial conditions, where the reaction-functions follow cycles of three periods. The market price never settles down, and is at all times strictly above marginal cost. Long-run average industry profits are approximately 5/6 of the monopoly level. These results demonstrate that neither a long horizon nor non-Markovian strategi...
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作者：Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM; Segal, U
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Efficient, anonymous, and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive, i.e., each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone's wealth. Equivalently, in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type. The characterization applies whether preferences are ordinal or quasilinear, and it also applies to continuum...
