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作者：Martimort, D
作者单位：Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
摘要：One striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators. This paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government's limited ability to commit. The separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a Stackelberg common agency game. With respect to the case of a single regulator, the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm's informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game. However, when r...
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作者：Francois, P; Shi, SY
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary cycles in an economy comprising independent investing firms. The economy is not subject to aggregate uncertainty, investors have no direct complementarities, and all agents act independently. The cycle arises due to general equilibrium contemporanrous complementarities between investors devoting resources to innovation which yields temporary profits. With numerical examples we show that there art: multip...
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作者：Deb, R; Razzolini, L
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Mississippi
摘要：We study the problem of strategy-proof mechanism design for indivisible and excludable public goods. Applying Vickrey's theory of auctions we associate a class of strategy-proof mechanisms to two types of procedures, the English Auction-Like Mechanism (EALM) and the Sealed Bid Auction-Like Mechanism (SBALM). We show that these two Auction-Like Mechanisms lead to identical outcomes. We justify the use of these mechanisms as compared to other strategy-proof mechanisms by arguing that outcomes of...
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作者：van Hees, M
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：Drawing on the game-theoretic analysis of rights, this paper re-examines the relation between liberal principles of decision making, on the one hand, and demands for stability and efficiency, on the other. Two possibility results are obtained. First, rights assignments in which individuals enjoy maximal freedom are shown to ensure the stability and efficiency of the decision process: there is always at least one Nash equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal outcome. Second, it is shown that a univers...
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作者：Jordan, JS; Xu, DB
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Models of the behavior of the firm under uncertainty typically assume that the joint probability distribution over all random variables is common knowledge, and only the realized values of some variables are observed differentially. The main result of this paper shows that if the knowledge of the relevant probabilities is initially decentralized, then expected-profit maximizing decisions can require unbounded communication, as measured by the minimal message space dimension. The result is obta...
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作者：Cabrales, A
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of complexity commonly used against this mechanism. For a mechanism that implements using the iterated deletion of dominated strategies, the dynamics converge but are less stable. Journal of Economic Literature Classifi...
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作者：Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
摘要：We study the asymptotic nucleolus of differentiable monopolistic market games in continuum economies with a finite number of traders' types, and show that, under appropriate assumptions, it is the center of symmetry of the subset of the core in which all the monopolists receive the same payoff: Thus, the nucleolus discriminates the traders in the atomless sector, whereas the competitive equilibrium does not. Moreover, if there is a single syndicated atom and a finite number of atomless sectors...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, A; Sönmez, T
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
摘要：In many real-life applications of house allocation problems, whenever an existing tenant wants to move, he needs to give up his current house before getting another one. This practice discourages existing tenants from such attempts and results in loss of potentially large gains from trade. Motivated by this observation, we propose a simple mechanism that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. Our approach is constructive and we provide two algorithms, each of which can...
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作者：Yoon, K
摘要：Wt construct a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium in Green and Porter's (1984, Econometrica 52, 87-100) imperfect public information model, which Paretodominates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Alós-Ferrer, C
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：Many models postulate a continuum of agents of finitely many types who are repeatedly randomly matched in pairs to perform certain activities (e.g., play a game) which may in turn make their types change. If the random matching process is left unspecified, no law of large numbers holds in this framework, casting doubts on the deterministic approximations which are usually informally invoked. This work shows that there exist random matching processes for a continuum of agents satisfying propert...
