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作者：Esteban, J; Ray, D
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Boston University
摘要：We develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics. The model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth, ethnicity, religion, and political ideology. We settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium. Conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics. However, in general, the conflict-distrib...
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作者：Marjit, S; Beladi, H
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Dayton
摘要：Growth in the import-competing output is usually accompanied by a decline in the volume of imports of the product. This result may change when we consider intermediate goods. We develop a multi-sector general equilibrium model to show that larger local output of an intermediate good may also imply larger imports of the same. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F1, F11, F13. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Chung, KS
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This note first uses a simple example to show that H. Matsushima's (1991, J. Econ. Theory 54, 198-203) regularity condition, to the contrary of his claim, actually does not imply C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gerard-Varet's (1979, J. Public Ei on. 11, 25-45) compatibility condition. It then proves a stronger version of Matsushima's proposition, namely that efficient public decision rules can be truthfully implemented with budget-balancing mechanisms under the, weak regularity condition. (C) 1999 Ac...
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作者：Brusco, S
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In situations of complete information, when a social choice function can be implemented using an extensive form game. it is always the case that there is an equilibrium which does not go beyond the first stage (that is, an equilibrium with one round of signaling). We show that this is not true in the incomplete information case. We provide: an example in which a social choice function cannot be implemented with an extensive form game if the mechanism has an equilibrium with one round of signal...
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作者：Arrow, KJ; Hahn, F
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Siena
摘要：A sequence economy is an economy with trade at every date and state. It is inessential if its equilibria coincide with those of the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. We examine some of the conditions for essentiality. (1) If there are transaction costs, then even if all states of nature are spanned by the securities, the economy is generically essential. (2) In the absence of transaction costs, we show by examples that spanning is neither necessary nor sufficient for inessentiality, the form...
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作者：Saari, DG
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A theory is developed to explain all possible three-alternative (single-profile) pairwise and positional voting outcomes. This includes all preference aggregation paradoxes, cycles, conflict between the Borda and Condorcet winners, differences among positional outcomes (e.g., the plurality and antiplurality methods), and differences among procedures using these outcomes (e.g., runoffs, Kemeny's rule, and Copeland's method). It is shown how to identify, interpret, and construct all profiles sup...
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作者：Roberts, K
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Conditions that exhaust the implications of rationality (homogeneity, symmetry, definiteness) are well known, but these apply under a single set of constraints. If a situation can be compared with another situation where extra constraints are imposed, there are stronger implications. One example is the (local) LeChatelier principle. However, a global LeChatelier principle does not always hold, and this paper shows that it cannot always hold in any nondegenerate problem. Despite this, a global ...
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作者：Thiele, H; Wambach, A
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Munich
摘要：This paper addresses the question of how the principal's surplus and agency costs depend on the agent's wealth. Our main results are that if the agent has an additively separable utility function in income and effort and his degree of absolute prudence is smaller than three times the agent's degree of absolute risk aversion, then the principal's expected pay-off is smaller the richer the agent. For general utility functions, this result also holds if the first order approach is applicable and ...
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作者：Gatti, JRJ
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper analyses the optimal search strategy for consumers who wish to purchase several different commodities, possibly from several different firms, but are not perfectly informed about the prices charged by each firm for every commodity. It is shown that in general the optimal search strategy will nor possess the Reservation Property, the multi-commodity equivalent of a Reservation Price. Necessary and sufficient conditions are identified for the optimal search strategy to possess the Res...
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作者：Caputo, MR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：The formal relationship between Silberberg's (J. Econ. Theory 7 (1974), 159-172) primal-dual method of comparative statics and Hatta's (Rev. Econ. Stud. 17 (1980), 957-997) gain method of comparative statics is established. It is proven that the primal-dual method generates all the comparative statics results derivable by the gain method, but not the converse. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C60, C61. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
