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作者：Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Mannheim; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In an auction with externalities, a buyer's type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the Nf I possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyer i (i = I,..., N) gets the object. We provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that For one-dimensional mechanisms. Although reservation utilities are endogenous and type-dependent, the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type. A main difficult...
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作者：Chakrabarti, SK
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：We show that Markov perfect equilibrium exists for stochastic games which have transition probabilities that are Markovian and product measurable in past period's realisation of the states of nature and actions, and. norm continuous in past period's actions. The transition probabilities are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to some measure v(t) every period. We then show that if the stochastic game is stationary and the measure: v is nonatomic, then there exists a semi-Markov eq...
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作者：Armstrong, M
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper presents an analysis of optimal regulation of a firm that has private information about both its cost and demand functions. An earlier paper on the same topic, Lewis and Sappington (Rand J. Econ. 19 (1998), 438-457), is reviewed, a difficulty with their analysis is discussed, and an alternative formulation of their model is proposed. Two broad classes of problem are considered: (i) the case where social and private incentives are roughly aligned, which implies optimal prices are (we...
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作者：Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：In this paper we prove several limit laws for non-additive probabilities. In particular, we prove that, under a multiplicative notion of independence and a regularity condition, if the elements of a sequence {X-k}(k greater than or equal to 1) are i.i.d. random variables relative to a totally monotone and continuous capacity v, then v({integral X-1 dv less than or equal to lim inf(n) 1/n (k=1)Sigma(n) X-k less than or equal to lim sup(n) 1/n (k=1)Sigma(n) X-k less than or equal to - integral -...
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作者：Balasko, Y
摘要：The usual assumptions about preferences and production technologies are easily justified when they involve elementary goods (differentiated by dates, locations, and states of nature). But it is far less easy to come up with direct justifications when only composite goods are traded. We show that the equilibria defined by the equality of supply and demand of composite goods coincide with the Walrasian equilibria of suitably defined economies whose commodity space is the composite commodity spac...
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作者：Da Rocha, JM; de Frutos, MA
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We analyze the advantages of centralization and decentralization in industries in which production takes place in several stages and the costs are privately observed by the agents in charge of production. We demonstrate that ''informational diseconomies arise when uncorrelated information is concentrated in the hands of a single agent. These diseconomies arise when the stages of production are different activities with different cost supports. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numb...
