Strategy-proof location on a network

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Schummer, J; Vohra, RV
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2807
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 405-428
• 关键词: strategy-proof; single-peaked preferences; graph; TREE

摘要

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).