On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Schmitz, PW
署名单位：
University of Bonn
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2790
发表日期：
2002
页码：
444-460
关键词：
摘要：
A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his or her valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information). The parties are risk neutral-they can rule out renegotiation and write complete contracts, It is shown that the first best cannot be achieved whenever the ex post efficient trade decision is trivial. The second-best contract is characterized and an application or the model to the choice of risky projects is briefly discussed. (C) 2001 ELsevier Science (USA).
来源URL：