Strong belief and forward induction reasoning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Battigalli, P; Siniscalchi, M
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2942
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 356-391
• 关键词: conditional belief; Strong belief; forward induction; rationalizability; Intuitive criterion

摘要

We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).