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作者：Bhaskar, V; van Damme, E
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We clarify the role of mixed strategies and public randomization (sunspots) in sustaining near-efficient outcomes in repeated games with private monitoring. We study a finitely repeated game, where the stage game has multiple equilibria and show that mixed strategies can support partial cooperation, but cannot approximate full cooperation even if monitoring is almost perfect. Efficiency requires extensive form correlation. where strategies can condition upon a sunspot at the end of each period...
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作者：Binmore, K; McCarthy, J; Ponti, G; Samuelson, L; Shaked, A
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; Universitat d'Alacant; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency...
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作者：Goeree, JK; Holt, CA; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：University of Virginia; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper applies the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to study overbidding in private-values auctions. Experimental evidence shows that the prevalence of overbidding depends on the cost of overbidding relative to underbidding, as predicted theoretically. We use QRE as an error structure to estimate parameters of several competing models of overbidding. A QRE model based on risk averse bidders closely tracks the exact distribution of bids. The estimated parameters are significant and ...
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作者：Le Van, C; Morhaim, L
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper we propose a unifying approach to the study of optimal growth models with bounded or unbounded returns (above-below). Following our approach, we prove the existence of optimal solutions and show, without using the contraction method, that the value function is the unique solution to the Bellman equation for a particular class of functions. The value function can be obtained by the usual algorithm defined by the operator provided by the Bellman equation. Moreover, following our ap...
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作者：Nishimura, K; Venditti, A
作者单位：Kyoto University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a two-sector economy with positive intersectoral external effects and nonincreasing social returns. We show that if the discount factor p is close to 1 then local indeterminacy may be obtained with mild market imperfections. Moreover, with additional conditions, when p is made smaller the steady state becomes totally unstable and quasi-periodic cycles, along which equilibrium paths are indeterminate, may appear through a Hopf bifurcation. This will be proved even if the investment ...
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作者：Costa-Gomes, MA
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：M. Rabin (1994. J. Econ. Theory 63, 374 391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ. 20. 568 587) on structured preplay communic...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; Obara, I
作者单位：University of Essex; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We analyze repeated prisoners' dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and construct mixed trigger strategy equilibria, Such strategies have a simple representation, where a player's action only depends upon her belief that her opponent(s) are continuing to cooperate. When monitoring is almost perfect. the symmetric efficient outcome can be approximated in any prisoners' dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of such games. The ef...
