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作者：Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Haifa
摘要：Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment. Even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits, we find that under Cournot competition this is not generally the case: It holds when firms' technology exhibits constant returns to scale, but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Hauenschild, N
作者单位：University of Hamburg
摘要：This paper analyzes the impact of pay-as-you-go financed social security on the stochastic process for the capital stock in a stochastic overlapping generations model. It is shown that the probability distribution of the capital stock in absence of social security dominates that in a pay-as-you-go system in the sense of stochastic dominance. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the sufficient conditions ensuring the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a pay-as-you-go syste...
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作者：Segal, U; Sobel, J
作者单位：Boston College; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by U(x(1),..., x(n)) = min{X-k}, U(x(1),..., x(n)) = max {x(k)}, U(X-1,..., x(n)) = Sigmau(x(k)), or combinations of these functionals. The main assumption is partial separability, where changing a common component of two vectors does not reverse strict preferences, but may turn strict preferences into indifference. We discuss applications of our results to social choice. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Aragones, E; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously cho...
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作者：Eraslan, H; Merlo, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q less than or equal to n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement rules other than the unanimity rule. the equilibrium payoffs nee...
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作者：Berentsen, A; Molico, M; Wright, R
作者单位：University of Bern; Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We introduce lotteries (randomized trading) into search-theoretic models of money. In a model with indivisible goods and fiat money, we show goods trade with probability 1 and money trades with probability tau, where tau < 1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power. With divisible goods, a nonrandom quantity q trades with probability 1 and, again, money trades with probability where tau < 1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power. Moreover, q never exceeds the efficient quantity (not tr...
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作者：Dutta, B; Jackson, MO; Le Breton, M
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study the impact of strategic choices of self-interested candidates of whether or not to enter an election. We focus on strategic candidacy in the context of the tree and binary voting procedures used by small groups such as committees. We offer a comprehensive analysis for the special but important case of voting by successive elimination. Strategic candidacy slightly enlarges the set of candidates that can be equilibrium outcomes relative to the traditional analysis which takes the set of...
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作者：Eraslan, H
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this characterization, we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. For the case where the players have the same discount factor, we show that the...
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作者：Mailath, GJ; Morris, S
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
摘要：In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior, and thus support cooperative outcomes, but with private monitoring, such coordination may no longer be possible. Even though grim trigger is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) in games with public monitoring, it often fails to be an equilibrium in arbitrarily close games with private monitoring. If a PPE has players' behavior conditioned only on finite histories, then it induces, an...
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作者：Garratt, R; Keister, T; Qin, CZ; Shell, K
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Cornell University; New York University
摘要：We analyze sunspot-equilibrium prices in nonconvex economics with perfect markets and a continuous sunspot variable. Our primary result is that every sunspot equilibrium allocation can be supported by prices that, when adjusted for probabilities, are constant across states. This result extends to the case of a finite number of equally-probable states under a nonsatiation condition, but does not extend to general discrete state spaces. We use our primary result to establish the equivalence of t...
