Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bhaskar, V; Obara, I
署名单位：
University of Essex; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2878
发表日期：
2002
页码：
40-69
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze repeated prisoners' dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and construct mixed trigger strategy equilibria, Such strategies have a simple representation, where a player's action only depends upon her belief that her opponent(s) are continuing to cooperate. When monitoring is almost perfect. the symmetric efficient outcome can be approximated in any prisoners' dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of such games. The efficiency result extends when there are more than two players. It requires that monitoring be sufficiently accurate but does not require very low discounting when a public randomization device is available. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.