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作者：Compte, O
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：I consider a repeated prisoners' dilemma where in each period, each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent's current action. I show,that when players are patient enough, any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies (i.e., do not revert to cooperation once they have started defecting) yields players a value arbitrarily close to the mutual minimax. I also examine the robustness of the result to perturbations of the game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Anbarci, N; Skaperdas, S; Syropoulos, C
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in guns) that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We compare bargaining solutions within a class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions. Under sy...
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作者：Laslier, JF; Picard, N
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from Downsian. two-party, electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Schmitz, PW
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms' benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard resul...
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作者：Becker, RA; Tsyganov, EN
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We prove an existence theorem for a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium under borrowing constraints in a two-sector model with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. The most patient agent holds all the capital in this solution. We also show that if the capital goods sector is capital intensive and capital income is increasing in the aggregate capital stock, then the aggregate capital stock eventually is monotonic and converges to the steady state stock. If the consumption goods sector is...
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作者：Myerson, RB
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Scoring rules are compared by their equilibria in simple voting games with Poisson population uncertainty. using new techniques for computing pivot probabilities. Best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can generate discriminatory equilibria where the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, although he may be universally liked, or may be symmetric to other candidates as in the Condorcet cycle. Such discriminatory equilibria are eliminated by worst-punishing rules like ne...
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作者：Santos, MS
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper presents some examples of regular dynamic economies with externalities and taxes that either lack existence of a Markov equilibrium or such equilibrium. is not continuous. These examples pose further challenges for the analysis and computation of these economics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C10, C62. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Van Huyck, J; Battalio, R
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and, hence, can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of routine learning. In this paper, subjects confront a sequence of similar, but not identical, bargaining games all of which can be solved using the same deductive principles. Conventions based on these deductive principles emerge within 70 periods in 5 of 26 eight-person cohorts. We found no economically significant diffe...
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作者：Camerer, CF; Ho, TH; Chong, JK
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania; National University of Singapore
摘要：Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payoff information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. The generalized model assumes there is a mixture of adaptive learners and so...
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作者：Austen-Smith, D; Banks, JS; Rustichini, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology; Boston University
摘要：This introduction to the JET symposium on political science briefly reviews the main results of the papers in this issue and tries to put them in the context of the current research in political theory. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
