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作者：Shachat, JM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper reports on a set of experiments designed to discriminate among the possible sources of the failure of the unique mixed strategy minimax equilibrium of the O'Neill (1987) game. This is accomplished by introducing a new methodology for eliciting mixed strategies, which overcomes some of the difficulties encountered by previous experimental studies. The results clearly show that subjects' choices do not coincide with their minimax strategies, and that players' intended behavior is not ...
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作者：Ghiglino, C
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：Endogenous growth theory has had some success in explaining the observed data related to the process of economic growth. However, the results of the models in this literature are typically very sensitive to their micro-economic structure. It is therefore important to understand how the growth process behaves under more general specifications of such features as the number of commodities, the number and preferences of consumers, the factors of production, and the financial and information struc...
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作者：Sorger, G
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study issues related to the long-run distribution of wealth in two variants of Ramsey's model of optimal capital accumulation. First we show that, in the case where a government levies a progressive income tax, there exist infinitely many stationary equilibria in which all households own positive capital stocks. Moreover, it is demonstrated that non-stationary equilibria can exhibit complicated dynamics. Then we discuss the case where households exercise market power on the capital market a...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：University of Osaka; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies collusion in repeated Bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each firm are their private information and are positively correlated. It derives general sufficient conditions for efficient collusion through communication and a simple grim-trigger strategy This analyses is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond differently to price deviations. In this model, it is shown that the above sufficient ...
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作者：Kandori, M
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted: repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematica...
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作者：Ely, JC; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southampton
摘要：We prove the Folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Piccione, M
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In this paper, I study a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Anwar, AW
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：Recent stochastic evolutionary models have shown that the most likely outcome when the probability of a mutation is sufficiently small is coordination on the risk-dominant strategy rather than on the payoff-dominant one. This paper looks at the consequences of player movement between locations when there are constraints which limit the number of agents who can reside at each location. If the constraints are tight then the risk-dominance result continues to hold. However, we show that when suff...
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作者：Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Yale University; University of Southampton
摘要：This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game under the strong long run average payoff criterion. The qualitative features of the optimal entry strategy are shown to depend exclusively on the relative rank...
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作者：Gajdos, T
摘要：The (generalized) Gini indices rely on the social welfare function of a decision maker who behaves in accordance with Yaari's model, with a function f that transforms frequencies. This SWF can also be represented as the weighted sum of the welfare of all the possible coalitions in the society, where the welfare of a coalition is defined as the income of the worst-off member of that coalition. We provide a set of axioms (Ak) and prove that the three following statements are equivalent: (i) the ...
