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作者：Prat, A
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tilburg University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not Cooled by electoral expenditures: they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine ...
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作者：Garratt, R; Keister, T
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：In nonconvex environments, a sunspot equilibrium can sometimes be destroyed by the introduction of new extrinsic information. We provide a simple test for determining whether or not a particular equilibrium survives, or is robust to, all possible refinements of the state space. We use this test to provide a characterization of the set of robust sunspot-equilibrium allocations of a given economy; it is equivalent to the set of equilibrium allocations of the associated lottery economy. (C) 2002 ...
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作者：Prescott, EC; Shell, K
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Cornell University
摘要：This introduces the symposium on sunspots and lotteries. Two stochastic general-equilibrium concepts, sunspot equilibrium (SE) and lottery equilibrium (LE), are compared. It is shown that, for some general, pure-exchange economies which allow for consumption nonconvexities or moral hazards, the set of LE allocations is equivalent to the set of SE allocations provided that the randomizing device can generate events of any probability. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Boldrin, M; Levine, DK
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：It has been argued that concave models exhibit less endogencity of growth than models with increasing returns to scale. Here we study a simple model of factor saving technological improvement in a concave framework. Capital ran be used either to reproduce itself, or, at some additional cost, to produce a higher quality of capital, which requires less labor input. If better quality capital can be produced quickly, we get a model of exogenous balanced growth as a special case of ours. If, howeve...
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作者：Banks, JS; Duggan, J; Le Breton, M
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments. and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably infinite strategy spaces, and as a special case. we obtain a long-standing claim to the same effect. due to R. McKelvey (Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 30 (1986), 283-314). in the political science literature. Further. we prove the nonemptiness of the uncovered set under ...
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作者：Stachurski, J
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper considers a neoclassical optimal growth problem where the shock that perturbs the economy in each time period is potentially unbounded on the state space. Sufficient conditions for existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria are derived in terms of the primitives of the model using recent techniques from the field of perturbed, dynamical systems. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Crawford, VP
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
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作者：Johnson, EJ; Camerer, C; Sen, S; Rymon, T
作者单位：Columbia University; California Institute of Technology; Boston University; Reichman University
摘要：We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. The average offer was $2.11. Patterns of information search (measured with a computerized information display) show limited lookahead rather than backward induction, Equilibrium theories which adjust for social utilities (reflecting inequality-aversion or reciprocity) cannot explain the results because they predict subjects will make equilibrium offers to robot play...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Moselle, B
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; The Brattle Group
摘要：We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distributive dimensions, In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, despite having preferences that are separable over the two dimensions. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions, and the set of legislators who approve winning proposals does not always consist of ideologically adjacent legislators. There is more t...
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作者：Bali, V; Jackson, M
作者单位：Michigan State University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the revenue in auctions of a single object when the number of bidders becomes large. We show that all sequences of auctions belonging to a class of mechanisms have limiting expected revenue equal to the expected best-use value of the object. An important special case that is covered is common value auctions, but more generally not even affiliation of values is assumed. This provides an asymptotic revenue equivalence result for settings beyond that of private values. (C) 2002 Elsevier ...
