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作者：Hauk, E; Hurkens, S
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by E. van Damme (1989, J. Econ. Theory 48, 476-496) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) capture this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (J. Swinkels, 1992, J. Econ. Theory 57, 30...
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作者：Katok, E; Sefton, M; Yavas, A
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Nottingham
摘要：We report experimental results on the relative performance of simultaneous and sequential versions of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism. Under the simultaneous version, subjects typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of iterations of dominance. Consequently the unique strategy surviving iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies is rarely observed. Under the sequential version, subjects also typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited ...
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作者：Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Ghiglino, C; Sorger, G
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economics such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty ...
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作者：Nishimura, K; Shimomura, K
作者单位：Kyoto University; Kobe University
摘要：This paper introduces sector-specific externalities in the Heckscher Ohlin two-country dynamic general equilibrium model to show that indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in the world market can occur. Under certain conditions in terms of factor intensities, there are multiple equilibrium paths from the same initial distribution of capital in the world market, and the distribution of capital in the limit differs among equilibrium paths. One equilibrium path converges to a long-run equilibrium...
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作者：Ortigueira, S; Santos, MS
作者单位：Cornell University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：In this paper we are concerned with the equilibrium dynamics of a two-sector model of endogenous growth with distortionary taxes. We show that for certain parameters values and tax schemes every equilibrium orbit-except the steady state solution-is non-interior; i.e., there are times in which one of the sectors is inactive. This analysis confirms that in multisector models the set of easily checkable, universal conditions that can guarantee the interiority of equilibrium solutions is rather li...
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作者：Compte, O
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This paper examines a dynamic game in which each player only observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played. Our main result is that in a repeated prisoner's dilemma where defections are irreversible (at least for a long enough period of time), patient enough players may achieve almost efficient outcomes. Dealing with models of imperfect private monitoring is difficult because (i) continuation games are games or incomplete information, hence they do not have the same structure a...
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作者：Blume, LE; Easley, D
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We ask if natural selection in markets favors profit-maximizing firms and, if so, is there a difference between the predictions of models which assume all firms are profit maximizers and the predictions of models which explicitly take account of population dynamics in the market. We show that market selection favors profit maximizing firms, but we also show that the long-run behavior of evolutionary market models is nonetheless not consistent with equilibrium models based on the profit-maximiz...
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作者：Kehoe, TJ; Levine, DK; Prescott, EC
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study a prototypical class of exchange economics with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold. To establish these results, we introduce the concept of the stand-in consumer economy, which is a standard, convex, finite consumer, finite good, pure exchange economy. With decreasing absolute risk aversion and no indivisibilities, we prove that no lotteries are ac...
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作者：Krusell, P; Kurusçu, B; Smith, AA Jr
作者单位：University of Rochester; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We then characterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consist...
