Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dutta, B; Jackson, MO; Le Breton, M
署名单位：
Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2862
发表日期：
2002
页码：
190-218
关键词：
摘要：
We study the impact of strategic choices of self-interested candidates of whether or not to enter an election. We focus on strategic candidacy in the context of the tree and binary voting procedures used by small groups such as committees. We offer a comprehensive analysis for the special but important case of voting by successive elimination. Strategic candidacy slightly enlarges the set of candidates that can be equilibrium outcomes relative to the traditional analysis which takes the set of candidates as fixed. Pareto-dominated candidates can be elected in equilibrium under voting by successive elimination when strategic candidacy is considered, in contrast with a fixed set of candidates. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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