Majority rule in a Stochastic model of bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eraslan, H; Merlo, A
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2811
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 31-48
• 关键词: Noncooperative bargaining; Voting rules; stochastic games

摘要

In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q less than or equal to n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement rules other than the unanimity rule. the equilibrium payoffs need not be unique. Furthermore, even when the equilibrium is unique, it need not be efficient. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).