Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aragones, E; Palfrey, TR
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2821
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 131-161

摘要

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fail to exist in this model, except under special conditions about delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium with no-gaps. show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D. and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies. We find that both players' equilibrium strategies converge to the expected median voter as A's advantage shrinks to 0. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).