Measuring inequalities without linearity in envy: Choquet integrals for symmetric capacities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gajdos, T
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2851
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 190-200
• 关键词: inequality measurement; Choquet integral; symmetric capacities

摘要

The (generalized) Gini indices rely on the social welfare function of a decision maker who behaves in accordance with Yaari's model, with a function f that transforms frequencies. This SWF can also be represented as the weighted sum of the welfare of all the possible coalitions in the society, where the welfare of a coalition is defined as the income of the worst-off member of that coalition. We provide a set of axioms (Ak) and prove that the three following statements are equivalent: (i) the decision maker respects (Ak), (ii) f is a polynomial of degree k, (iii) the weight of all coalitions with more than k members is equal to zero. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).