On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hauk, E; Hurkens, S
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2856
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 66-90
• 关键词: forward induction; Strategic stability; EES sets; index theory

摘要

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by E. van Damme (1989, J. Econ. Theory 48, 476-496) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) capture this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (J. Swinkels, 1992, J. Econ. Theory 57, 306-332) is always consistent with forward induction. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).