On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Compte, O
署名单位：
Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2868
发表日期：
2002
页码：
151-188
关键词：
摘要：
I consider a repeated prisoners' dilemma where in each period, each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent's current action. I show,that when players are patient enough, any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies (i.e., do not revert to cooperation once they have started defecting) yields players a value arbitrarily close to the mutual minimax. I also examine the robustness of the result to perturbations of the game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.