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作者：Demichelis, S; Ritzberger, K
摘要：A connected component of Nash equilibria is (dynamically) potentially stable if there exits an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. A necessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if the latter is nonzero, the component contains a strategically stable set. If the Enter characteristic would be zero, the dynamics (that justifies potential stability) could be s...
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作者：Jerez, B
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve...
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作者：Khan, MA; Sun, YN
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：For a market with an atomless continuum of assets, we formulate the intuitive idea of a well-diversified portfolio, and present a notion of exact arbitrage, strictly weaker than the more conventional notion of asymptotic arbitrage, and necessary and sufficient for the validity of an APT pricing formula. Our formula involves essential risk, one based on a specific index portfolio constructed from factors and factor loadings that are endogenously extracted to satisfy an optimality property invol...
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作者：Fieseler, K; Kittsteiner, T; Moldovanu, B
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Oxford
摘要：We analyze the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations and with a dispersed ownership. A main role is played by the effects of adverse selection on incentive payments and budget constraints. Variations in the degree of interdependence directly influence the incentive payments and ultimately lead to a tightening or relaxation of the budget constraint, thus affecting the ability to achieve efficient trade. We derive precise possibility conditions for efficie...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, A; Sönmez, T
作者单位：Koc University; Columbia University
摘要：Using lotteries is a common tool for allocating indivisible goods. Since obtaining preferences over lotteries is often difficult, real-life mechanisms usually rely on ordinal preferences over deterministic outcomes. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (J. Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 623) show that the outcome of an ex post efficient mechanism may be stochastically dominated They define a random assignment to be ordinally efficient if and only if it is not stochastically dominated. In this paper we investigate...
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作者：Koessler, F
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Shin (J. Econom. Theory 64 (1994) 253-264) showed that a perfectly revealing equilibrium fails to exist in persuasion games when the decision maker is uncertain about the interested party's payoff-relevant information. By explicitly integrating higher-order uncertainty into the information structure, this note shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained to intervals of the payoff-relevant state space. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights r...
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作者：Amir, R; Lambson, VE
作者单位：Brigham Young University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA)...
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作者：Kovalenkov, A; Wooders, M
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied...
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作者：Radner, R; Ray, D
作者单位：New York University
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作者：Austen-Smith, D
