From evolutionary to strategic stability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Demichelis, S; Ritzberger, K
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00078-4
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 51-75
• 关键词: Dynamic stability; evolutionary game theory; index theory; Strategic stability

摘要

A connected component of Nash equilibria is (dynamically) potentially stable if there exits an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. A necessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if the latter is nonzero, the component contains a strategically stable set. If the Enter characteristic would be zero, the dynamics (that justifies potential stability) could be slightly perturbed so as to remove all zeros close to the component. Hence, any robustly potentially stable component contains equilibria that satisfy the strongest rationalistic refinement criteria. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.