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作者：Kalai, G
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In this paper we study the learnability of the class of rationalizable choice functions using the basic concept of PAC-learnability from statistical learning theory. We prove that the class of rationalizable choice functions on N alternatives is learnable from O(N) examples and is optimal in terms of PAC-learnability among classes which are invariant under permutations of the elements. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Peters, M
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper contrasts models of common agency in which principals compete in incentive contracts (that is, they make take it or leave it offers) with models where principals offer agents menus of incentive contracts from which the final contract is negotiated. It is shown that pure strategy equilibria in incentive contracts are robust to the possibility that principals might offer menus. In addition, a no-externalities condition is given such that any pure strategy equilibrium allocation with m...
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作者：Baptista, AM
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：In this paper, we investigate the existence of multiperiod American options generating dynamically complete markets. We show that if a primitive security separates states at the terminal date, then generically there exist multiperiod American options on that security generating dynamically complete markets. We also provide an example of an economy in which multiperiod American options on a primitive security generate dynamically complete markets, while multiperiod European options do not. (C) ...
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作者：Barlevy, G; Veronesi, P
作者单位：University of Chicago; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper offers an explanation for stock market crashes which focuses on the role of rational but uninformed traders. We show that uninformed traders can precipitate a price crash because as prices decline, they surmise that informed traders received negative information, which leads them to reduce their demand for assets and drive the price of stocks even lower. The model yields several implications, such as that crashes can occur even when the fundamentals are strong, and that the magnitud...
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作者：Wärneryd, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We consider two-player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value. For settings where one player knows the value of the prize, while the other only knows its prior distribution, we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent. In the special case of a lottery contest, equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. (C) 2003 E...
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作者：Ben-Gad, M
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：This paper investigates the dynamic behavior of two-sector models of endogenous growth with sector-specific external effects, and government expenditure financed by distortionary taxation. When this type of external effect is combined with a sufficient degree of capital taxation in a Lucas-Uzawa endogenous growth model, continua of equilibria will emerge in the region of the balanced growth paths. By contrast, indeterminacy is not possible when either sector-specific external effects or factor...
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作者：Segal, I
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. These effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more. The prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case, and have littl...
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作者：Takeoka, N
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：A technique to show the existence of stationary Markov equilibria is provided by Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell and McLennan Econometrica 62 (1994) 745-781. In many applications, a state space is constructed as the product of a space of exogenous variables and a space of endogenous variables. In addition, the exogenous shock is given and is a Markov process with a transition probability and an initial distribution. Then their theorem does not ensure the existence of a stationary Markov equili...
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作者：Govindan, S; Wilson, R
作者单位：Stanford University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：A new algorithm is presented for computing Nash equilibria of finite games. Using Kohlberg and Mertens' structure theorem we show that a homotopy method can be represented as a dynamical system and implemented by Smale's global Newton method. The algorithm is outlined and computational experience is reported. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Meng, QL
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper extends research in indeterminacy literature to a small open economy, two-sector endogenous growth model. It shows that a continuum of equilibria exist in two situations, (i) the production functions exhibit social constant returns to scale with very small or even negligible externalities; and (ii) the production functions are standard constant returns to scale without externalities but the government implements asymmetric tax policies across sectors. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA)...
