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作者：Messner, M; Polborn, MK
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Pompeu Fabra University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper builds on Cremer's (Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986) 33) seminal analysis which shows that (almost) complete cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game played by overlapping generations of players if the institution in which players cooperate is infinitely lived. We analyze a similar model in which the costs of cooperation are subject to random shocks. Even if these random shocks are very small, the range of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained is decreased consi...
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作者：Benchekroun, H
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a doupoly. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction. Surprisingly, such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long-run asset's stock. We also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset's stock and the long-run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restric...
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作者：Bech, ML; Garratt, R
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real-time gross settlement setting. The game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and it encompasses two well-known game theoretical paradigms: the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt. The former arises in a collateralized credit regime where banks have an incentive to postpone payments when daylight liquidity is costly, an ou...
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作者：Ennis, HM; Keister, T
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output. In addition, the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks, and thereby affects the long-run growth rate. These facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods. A ...
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作者：Spear, SE
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper examines the effects of imperfect competition in unregulated electricity markets from a general equilibrium perspective, and demonstrates that horizontal market power can explain both the large peak-period price spikes observed recently in California and elsewhere, and the marked reduction in addition to capacity that have also occurred during the transition to competitive markets. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Beaudry, P; González, FM
作者单位：University of British Columbia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper shows how the interaction between decentralized information gathering and discreteness of investment decisions at the individual level can generate random fluctuations in aggregate investment that involve occasionally large allocation errors. This interaction is illustrated in a model in which private information is costly to acquire and prices reveal information. The unique rational expectations equilibrium outcome of the model is shown to always be noisy and characterized by inves...
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作者：Al-Najjar, NI; Casadesus-Masanell, R; Ozdenoren, E
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We introduce a framework to study individuals' behavior in environments that are deterministic, but too complex to permit tractable deterministic representations. An agent in these environments uses a probabilistic model to cope with his inability to think through all contingencies in advance. We interpret this probabilistic model as embodying all patterns the agent perceives, yet allowing for the possibility that there may be important details he had missed. Although the implied behavior is r...
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作者：Peralta-Alva, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
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作者：Jackson, MO; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
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作者：Levy, M
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We formulate a general stochastic process of wealth accumulation by capital investment and analyze the conditions required to ensure convergence to the empirically observed Pareto wealth distribution. While homogeneous investment talent leads to the Pareto distribution under very general conditions, even a mild degree of differential investment talent results in a non-Pareto wealth distribution. This finding suggests that chance, rather than differential investment talent, is the dominant fact...
