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作者：Ng, MC
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：In an abstract model with asymmetric information, we show that there is a duality relationship between the prior beliefs and trading demands of bets for any given individual. Then we aggregate all the agents to obtain a second duality relationship between common prior beliefs and trading possibilities. We easily derive from these relationships the no trade theorem and its converse. General efficiency results can be obtained. Moreover, our framework is sufficiently general to cover special case...
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作者：Balasko, Y
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：With the exception of existence, not much is known of economies where individual preferences may depend on prices. We show that the main properties of competitive equilibria that fall under the general heading of qualitative comparative statics remain true when preferences are price-dependent, provided that the total resources are allowed to vary in the parameter space. The equilibrium set is a smooth manifold diffeomorphic to a Euclidean space; the natural projection is a smooth proper map, w...
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作者：Blouin, MR
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal
摘要：I analyze a market in which a price-taking buyer buys a variable-quality good from a population of sellers, contrasting the case where quality is a seller's private information to that where it is public information. Average quality traded under private information can be either higher (quality oversupply) or lower (quality undersupply) than under public information, depending on sellers' preferences. We are likely to see quality undersupply if (i) sellers' preferences exhibit substitutability...
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作者：Roche, H
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We re-examine the representative agent's optimal consumption and savings under uncertainty in the presence of investment constraints using martingale representation and convex analysis techniques. This framework allows us to explicitly quantify precautionary savings which induces a higher average growth rate than in a certainty setup. We provide a closed form solution for a Cobb-Douglas economy. The effect of uncertainty on portfolio selection is analyzed. Consumption growth rate and risk free...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible. It presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme which coordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders' payoffs. The paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium payoffs in a general environment with affiliated signals and private or interdependent values. With IPV, i...
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作者：Krishnamurthy, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Kiyotaki and Moore (J. Polit. Economy 105 (1997) 211) have offered a theory for how common shocks to credit-constrained firms are amplified through changes in collateral values and transmitted as fluctuations in output. I clarify and extend their model by showing that their collateral amplification mechanism is not robust to the introduction of markets that allow these firms to hedge against common shocks. A theory of incomplete hedging is proposed in which the supply of hedging available in t...
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作者：Sugden, R
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：A reference-dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented. In this theory, preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points (which may be uncertain acts). It is characterised by a set of axioms in a Savage-style framework. A restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states (encoded in a,satisfaction function') from attitudes to gains and losses of satisfaction. Given weak additional assumptions, the restricted theory ex...
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作者：Konishi, H; Ray, D
作者单位：New York University; Boston College; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at each node. We study existence of equilibrium PCFs. We connect deterministic equilibrium PCFs with unique ...
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作者：Fisher, FM
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Social welfare evaluation depends in part on value judgments as to income distribution. This paper proposes a metric for assessing the goodness of particular income distributions. That metric is then used to examine the effect of price changes on the goodness of a given distribution. Consider an increase in the price of a commodity that is disproportionately consumed by households with incomes that are high relative to the preferred income distribution. One naturally supposes that such a price...
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作者：Frankel, DM; Morris, S; Pauzner, A
作者单位：Cornell University; Yale University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient condition...
