A dual characterization of incentive efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jerez, B
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00064-4
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1-34
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; incentive efficiency; linear programming; Duality

摘要

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.